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Book Review

Legal Restraints On Racial Discrimination In Employment.

By

Michael I. Sovern. The Twentieth Century Fund, New York: 1966.
Pp. 270. $6.00.
"Underlying this whole work," Professor Sovern states, "is the
premise that the law can and should be invoked against racial discrimination in employment" (p. 7). Certainly this is a reasonable stance
and one to which all men of good will should subscribe. Professor
Sovern then attempts to buttress his premise by means of historical and
legal analysis of restraints against discrimination in employment.
Understandably, the heart of Professor Sovern's analysis is Title
VII of the recently enacted Civil Rights Bill of 1964. Wisely insisting,
however, that Title VII cannot be understood except in the light of
prior state and federal activity in this field (for, as I have indicated,
both historical and legal reasons), Professor Sovern devotes several
chapters to an examination of Fair Employment Practices (FEP) by
executive order and state activity in the field.
Unfortunately, his treatment of state activity in the field is limited
to a study of the New York Commission for Human Rights. And
although there are no doubt flaws in the New York Commission's
make-up, I would like to suggest that a more comprehensive approach
might yield a healthy sense of frustration, making criticism both more
likely and more fruitful." Let me make myself clear. I am not suggesting that Professor Sovern is unaware of the problems which beset
state agencies. He lists a variety of commission ills (including inadequate budgets, commission timidity, protracted conciliation efforts, and
soft settlements), which clearly demonstrate his grasp of the unfortunate situation that exists in FEP states.
What I would like to suggest is that his choice of New York as
a focal point for analysis seriously understates the problem as it exists
today. For example, in Table I, I have listed the budgets and per capita
expenditures (non-white population) of a number of Northern industrial states. These figures, I believe, illustrate the general inadequacy
of state expenditures in this field (it should be remembered that these
state agencies deal with other kinds of cases, for example, housing,
in addition to employment discrimination) and, in addition, the limited
state response to Title VIi.
1. See Hill, Twenty Years of State Fair Employment Practices: A Critical

Analysis with Recommendations, 14 BuPPALo L. Rev. 22 (1964) for such an approach.
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TABLE I*
COMPARATIVE

STAT4 CIVIL RIGHTS

,--

State

1964-65

585
California
121
Connecticut
75
Illinois .................60
Indiana
146
Massachusetts
Michigan -------------391
184
New Jersey
1700
New York -----------205
Ohio
656
Pennsylvania .
*
**

Budget in

$1,000

AGPNCY

-

1965-66

1966-67

650
137
99
66
170
635
250
1900
212
636

680
190
99
66
N.A.
943
298
2000
246
836

BUDGETS
Per Capita Expenditures
1966-67 Non-White
Population**

.54
1.71
.09
.24
1.28
.56
1.34
.31
.97

Source: Research Division, Ohio Civil Rights Commission.
Per capita expenditures based on 1960 population data.

Perhaps Professor Sovern only wished to spare us the unpleasant details, however, for he ends this chapter with a series of recommendations which give further indication of his awareness of this problem.
Professor Sovern's treatment of FEP by executive order is perhaps the best section of the book. Relegating the clearly inadequate
attempts of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations to an appendix, he devotes the entire chapter to the Kennedy and Johnson efforts
in this field. While a more critical approach might have yielded unexpected benefits, the analysis here is more than adequate.
Professor Sovern's treatment of Title VII is all we could hope
for under the circumstances. Written during the early days of the Act's
existence, the analysis is both detailed and accurate. He runs through
Title VII in good order, explaining in clear, uncluttered language what
it is about, what it will do, and what may reasonably be expected of it.
He rightly emphasizes the weakness of reliance upon conciliation (as
state experience has shown), but neglects, unfortunately, to give us
any analysis of the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission's
ability to meet the needs of Negroes in the most basic sense of adequate
staff or budget. 2 His analysis here is more legal than historical, which
is perhaps the major shortcoming of this chapter.
Professor Sovern's awareness of the shortcomings of Title VII
leads him -to a study of the role of the National Labor Relations Board.
After delineating the concept of fair representation which underlies
Board activity in this field, he discusses the role which the Board may
play in FEP and those sanctions which the Board has at its disposal.
2. Apparently the Commission faces serious problems in this area, for they were
equipped to handle only 2000 cases during the first year of operation. The fact
that they received over 8600 complaints indicates that, in the future, backlogs may
prove to be a serious problem. See EEOC Reviews First Year of Operation, CCH
EMPLOYMENT PRAcTIcns 6120 (7/11/66).
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Finally, Professor Sovern devotes a chapter to a New York Commission apprenticeship case. His historical treatment of the case is
coupled with hypothetical appeals to the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, the Secretary of Labor, and the National Labor
Relations Board. He ends this chapter with an all-too-brief conclusion
dealing with the general problems confronting Negroes when they attempt to enter the skilled trades.
My major quarrel with Professor Sovern is his heavy reliance on
legal mechanisms to combat discrimination in employment to the ex-

clusion of methods of self-help. He states (pp. 210-11) that:
In recent years aroused Negro groups have sometimes made
their own opportunities by engaging in consumer boycotts terminable only by the target's hiring of a specified number of Negroes.
Other groups have sought jobs through demonstrations, usually
less focused than the boycotts but aimed generally at dramatizing
the Negro's situation and inducing government officials to do
something.
One suspects that the energies spent on a large proportion of
these demonstrations would have been better devoted to exploiting
one or another of the legal remedies we have been discussing,

but the streets will remain a major forum for racial controversies
throughout the foreseeable future. When demonstrations seek
what the law would give, ignorance or impatience, frequently both,
are at work. Sensible information programs and more effective
administrative action can make major inroads on these.
My own position on this subject is at almost complete variance
with this. At the heart of the disagreement is the statement quoted
above that "When demonstrations seek what the law would give, ignorance or impatience, frequently both, are at work." For Mr. Sovern to
call the Negro demonstrator impatient, even though this puts him in
a category with some 85% of white Americans who think that the
Negro civil rights movement is moving "too fast,"' seems to me to display a serious lack of historical perspective. But my quarrel is not so
much with that as with the implicit assumption that the law can give
relief in all of these cases. As I have indicated, I am in agreement with
the premise underlying Professor Sovern's work - that the law can
and should be involved. But I do not believe that the law is capable, at
this time, of solving all the numerous and complex problems which
are present in this field. State FEP laws, according to Herbert Hill,
are a failure.4 Title VII, with its heavy reliance upon them (coupled
with its own major shortcomings, both legal and fiscal), seems clearly
inadequate to significantly alleviate these problems. Other federal
3. W.

BRINK

& L.

HARRIS, BLACK AND WI-ITt

120 (1967).

4. Hill, supra note 1, at 23. According to Ray Marshall, it is significant that

the racial demonstrations in Northern cities during 1963 and 1964 were in states and
municipalities with the most active FEP commissions. R. MARSHALL, Tssg NrcRo
WORKER 130 (1967).

MARYLAND

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXVII

attempts are equally handicapped. The Negro is faced, in many situations, with the choice of using self-help or of bowing to discrimination.
As I have indicated, Professor Sovern greatly undervalues the
current usefulness of direct action in the achievement of equal employment opportunity goals. However, in discussing the beginnings of
federal action in restraints on discrimination, Professor Sovern states
on Page 9 that:
It was not the hopes of minorities that brought relief, nor even
the horrors of racism elsewhere in the world, although the President was surely moved by them. The disquieting reality is that
President Roosevelt was embarrassed into acting by the threat of
a demonstration march on Washington. Scheduled for July 1,
1941, the march seemed likely to attract 100,000 Negroes to the
capital to protest against the substantial exclusion of Negroes from
employment in government and defense industries. The Administration exerted itself to 'have the march called off. Letters were
written and conferences were held, but without the President's firm
commitment to use his powers to obtain equal employment opportunity, the Negro leaders held fast. Finally, on June 23, the President capitulated and promulgated Executive Order 8802, prohibiting racial discrimination in government and defense industries.
As I indicated earlier, Professor Sovern's analysis of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 is primarily legal. Perhaps if he had engaged in more
historical analysis, he could have found some relationship between the
so-called civil rights revolution of 1960-64 (including the 1963 march
on Washington) and the passage of that bill. I should think that the
obvious lesson to be gained from this is that direct action has proven
to be of vital importance to the progress of the Negro.5 Undoubtedly
the time will come when this particular kind of action will no longer be
called for. That time is not yet here. So long as Negroes must depend
upon under-financed, under-staffed state and federal agencies for the
preservation of their rights, so long will self-help remain a very important part of any successful campaign. For Professor Sovern to
ignore this reality, while perhaps understandable, is unforgivable. It
is a defect which seriously mitigates what value the book might otherwise have.
Harry R. Blaine*
5. Professor Sovern's apparent distaste for demonstrations should not blind us
to the fact that demonstrations, including riots, are a form of political action. Although
no government can recognize mass violence as a legitimate form of protest, many
Negroes feel that they are forced to violence by a denial to them, because of their
race, of more acceptable means of protest. And even though both the strategy and
tactics of mass violence may be open to serious question, it can hardly be denied that
this type of action affords a dramatic confrontation between Negro aspirations and
the white power structure.
* Assistant Professor, The Labor Education and Research Service, The Ohio
State University. B.A., 1958, The Ohio State University, LL.B., 1962, Yale University.

